University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 12

Number 1

Article 7

10-1-1986

Federal Tax Treatment of Lump-Sum Distributions from
Disqualified Pension Plans
Susan Newhart Elliott
University of Dayton

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Elliott, Susan Newhart (1986) "Federal Tax Treatment of Lump-Sum Distributions from Disqualified
Pension Plans," University of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 12: No. 1, Article 7.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

COMMENT

FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF LUMP-SUM DISTRIBUTIONS FROM DISQUALIFIED PENSION PLANS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Compensation for services has long included benefits not realized
in periodic wage or salary payments. Among the most significant of
employee benefits are accumulating interests in arrangements such as
those represented by stock bonuses, profit-sharing, and pension plans.
Plans that result in deferred receipt of compensation have been subject
to varying tax treatment. Favorable treatment in some form has beenavailable for plans meeting statutory requirements1 that have become
increasingly complex.' Because of the complexity of and frequent
changes in the requirements and because a plan's status as qualified or
nonqualified is determined on a year-to-year basis,' a plan may be alternately nonqualified, qualified, disqualified, and requalified at different times throughout its operating life.
When contributions are made to a qualified plan, which is then
disqualified and a lump-sum distribution made to the participant, difficulty arises in determining the tax treatment of the distribution to the
participant/taxpayer. A split in opinion has developed among courts
with respect to appropriate treatment of such distributions. The Courts
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 4 and, very recently, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits5 have interpreted Internal Revenue Code (the Code) language by a "plain meaning" approach that results in the entire amount
of a disqualified-plan distribution being taxed as ordinary income. The
I. Courts and commentators have used various labels to refer to plans meeting statutory
requirements, most commonly, "exempt" plans (or trusts) or "'qualified" plans. This comment will
use the term "qualified." "Nonqualified" will refer to a plan that does not meet statutory requirements regardless of whether or not it has ever had qualified status. "Disqualified" will refer to a
plan that had qualified status which was later revoked.
2. See Rands, Disqualification of Employee Retirement Plans: The Wrong Remedy, 13
AKRON L. REv. 67, 71 n.22 (1979).
3. See Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 1966); Treas. Reg. § 1.401I(c) (1960) (All Treasury Regulation sections are codified in title 26 of the Code of Federal
Regulations.); Rev. Rul. 71-153, 1971-1 C.B. 127; Rev. Rul. 63-10, 1963-1 C.B. 90.
4. Woodson v. Commissioner, 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981).
5. Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985); Benbow v. Commissioner, 774
F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
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Tax CourtO and the Second Circuit, 7 however, employ an approach focusing on congressional policies and objectives that results in favorable
tax treatment for portions of a disqualified-plan distribution attributable to contributions made to the plan while it was qualified.
This comment offers an overview of the development of deferred
compensation tax law and an examination of the case law involving
treatment of lump-sum distributions from disqualified plans. It suggests
that while the plain meaning of the Code language may indeed require
that the entire amount of a disqualified-plan distribution is to be
treated as ordinary income, this treatment is inconsistent with the most
fundamental policies behind and objectives of deferred compensation
law and seriously threatens the employee interests the law was intended
to protect.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

An Overview of Deferred Compensation Tax Law

The income tax system that was implemented with the adoption of
the sixteenth amendment to the Constitution provided no special tax
treatment for pension or profit-sharing trusts for either the employer or
the employee. The regulations directed that "[n]o deduction . . . be
taken for contributions to a pension fund the resources of which are
held by the corporation, the amount deductible in such case being
[only] the amount actually paid to the employee." 8 Thus, if pension
plans were funded by an employer, the employer could take no deduction until funds were actually paid out to an employee. If plans were
funded by amounts held back from employee salaries, the amounts
would be treated no differently than other employee compensation--deductible to the employer and taxable to the employee at the
time credited to the fund. 9
With the close of World War I and the conversion of the national
economy to peacetime activities, Congress enacted tax benefits that
would allow employers to offer incentives, through stock bonus and
profit-sharing plans, "to attract and retain employees who could best
start the wheels of industry spinning at a high rate of productivity for
the good of the country as a whole."' 10 A trust that was part of an
employer's stock bonus or profit-sharing plan for employees was exempt

6. See, e.g., Baetens v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 152 (1984).
7. See, e.g., Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966).
8. Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 136 (1921).
9. This treatment remains in effect for plans that do not meet qualification requirements for
special tax treatment under the current code. i.R.C. § 402(b) (1982).
10. Goodman, Legislative Development of the Federal Tax Treatment of Pension and
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7
Profit-Sharing Plans, 49 TAXEs 226, 227 (1971).
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from income tax, offering a deduction for the employer and no inclusion in the income of the employee until distribution. 1 Pension plans
were similarly made exempt in 1926.12
The only essential requirements for qualification were that the
plan be designed to benefit employees and not to divert funds to stockholders. 3 A provision was enacted in 1938 requiring plans to provide
that all obligations to employees must be satisfied before funds could be
used for any other purpose." Discrimination among employees was,
however, not restricted: A true pension plan designed to benefit only
the highest-paid employee, the corporate president, was held to be a
qualified plan.' 5
World War II brought with it strict regulation of business and the
economy; 0 that regulation was extended to the deferred compensation
tax law in the Revenue Act of 194217 and introduced concepts that
underlie current deferred compensation law. The high taxation necessary to finance the war effort could have deprived the recipient of a
lump-sum distribution of a significant portion of his or her accumulated
interest.' 8 As a means of mitigating the harsh tax results, long-term
capital gains treatment was made available for lump-sum distributions
from qualified plans on account of the employee leaving his employer's
service. 19
To qualify for favorable tax treatment, plans could not "cover only
a small percentage of the employees or . . . favor the higher paid or
stock-holding employees." 0 Thus, retirement plans were to be encouraged by special tax treatment, but the tax laws were not to be used
II. Revenue Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 98, § 219(0, 42 Stat. 227, 247 (repealed 1939).
12. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, § 219(f), 44 Stat. 9, 33-34 (repealed 1939).
13. A plan that benefited only two stockholder-employees in a company with over 300 employees was held not to be a qualified plan. Hubbel v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 626 (1944).
14. Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. 552, § 165(a)(2), 52 Stat. 447, 518 (repealed 1939).
15. Phillips H. Lord, Inc. v. Commissioner, I T.C. 286 (1942).
16. See Goodman, supra note 10, at 230.
17. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, § 165(b), 56 Stat. 798, 863-66 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 404 (1982)).
18. Goodman, supra note 10, at 234. The progressive income tax system was designed so
that the highest rates would be applied only to amounts of income in excess of what was received
by the average taxpayer, and thus to taxpayers who regularly earned above-average incomes.
Lump-sum distributions would usually result in the receipt of income in excess-in the year of
distribution-of that received by the average taxpayer, although the distributee did not regularly
earn an above-average or even an average income. With normal taxes at 6%, a victory tax of 5%,
and a surtax reaching over 80% at the top, a taxpayer might be deprived of most of his accumulated earnings. Id.
19. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, § 165(b), 56 Stat. 789. With capital gains treatment, instead of paying tax on the entire amount of a lump-sum distribution, the taxpayer is
currently entitled to deduct 60% of the net gain from his or her gross income. I.R.C. § 1202(a)
(1982).
Published 20.
by eCommons,
H.R. REP. No.1986
2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1942).
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by corporate executives for excessive compensation in contravention of
the Emergency Price Control Act.21 Seventy percent of all full-time
22
employees had to be covered in a qualified plan. Additional restrictions for qualified plans were added in the 1954 Code, including the
requirement that a qualified employee's trust refrain from engaging in
any of a number of prohibited transactions that might divert funds
23
from the exclusive benefit of general employees.
In 1962, Congress, for the first time, extended favorable tax treat2
ment to qualified plans for self-employed persons, " who had previously
been ineligible for any favorable tax treatment. Lump-sum distribu25
tions, however, were not eligible for capital gains treatment but were
28
taxed as ordinary income subject to five-year forward averaging.
The capital gains treatment available for qualified plan participants who were not self-employed was the subject of frequent criti-

21. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. 421, 56 Stat. 23 (repealed 1947). Price
and salary regulations were instituted to control inflation and competition for labor during the
war. See Goodman, supra note 10, at 230. Requirements that qualified plans be nondiscriminatory
prevented corporate executives from ostensibly maintaining a previous salary level while using
plans to set aside, tax-free, large amounts of money for later enjoyment. Id.
22. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. 753, § 165(a)(3)(A), 56 Stat. 798, 862 (1942) (current
version at 26 U.S.C. § 501 (1982)). This would exclude "the use of discriminatory plans which
either cover only a small percentage of the employees or else favor the higher paid or stockholding employees as against the lower-paid or non-stock-holding employees." HR. REP. No.
2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1942).
23. I.R.C. 1] 503(b) (1982). Prohibited transactions include those in which the plan
(1) lends any part of its income or corpus, without the receipt of adequate security and
a reasonable rate of interest, to;
(2) pays any compensation, in excess of a reasonable allowance for salaries or other
compensation for personal services actually rendered, to;
(3) makes any part of its services available on a preferential basis to;
(4) makes any substantial purchase of securities or any other property, for more than
adequate consideration in money or money's worth, from;
(5) sells any substantial part of its securities or other property, for less than an adequate consideration in money or money's worth, to; or
(6) engages in any other transaction which results in a substantial diversion of its
income or corpus to;
the creator of such organization . . .or a corporation controlled by such creator . ...
Id.
24. Self-Employed Individuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-792, 76 Stat.
809 (codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 37, 62, 72, 101, 104-05, 172, 401-05, 503, 805, 2039, 2517, 3306,
3401, 6041, 7207 (1982)).
25. I.R.C. §§ 402(a)(2), 403(a)(2) (1982).
26. I.R.C. § 72(n)(2) (1982). Thus, although the self-employed taxpayer was not entitled to
the capital gains deduction from his or her gross income in the year of the lump-sum distribution,
neither would the entire amount of the distribution be included in his or her taxable income for
the year. Instead, taxation of the amount of the distribution would be spread over the next five
years (including the year of distribution), so that tax payment would be deferred and the highest
of the progressive rates at which the distribution would be taxed in any one year might be considerably lower (particularly for the middle- or lower-income earner) than if the entire amount had
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7
been included in income in the year of distribution.
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cism:27 (1)It not only deferred taxation of compensation from the time
earned, it changed the nature of the income from ordinary to capital;
(2) it discriminated against the self-employed, for whom only forward
income-averaging was available; (3) it disproportionately benefited taxpayers with the highest incomes.28 Under the Tax Reform Act of
1969,29 capital gains treatment was accorded to only those portions of a
distribution attributable to contributions made before 1970 and to appreciation or interest accruing at any time. Amounts attributable to
contributions made after 1970 were taxable as ordinary income, subject
to seven-year averaging. 30 The provisions were so complex that the
Treasury Department had difficulty drafting regulations for
computations. 3 '
Deferred compensation law was overhauled by the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 32 which was intended to regulate private retirement plans to assure "retirement income security" and "protection of individual pension rights. '' 33 Under
ERISA, portions of lump-sum distributions from qualified plans attributable to contributions made before 1974 are entitled to capital gains
treatment, while portions attributable to contributions made after 1974
are taxable as ordinary income but are subject to ten-year forward
averaging. 3" Recognizing that employees may change positions and employers several times during their working lives,35 Congress provided
for the tax-free transfer of an employee's entire interest from one qualified plan to another or to an Individual Retirement Account
(IRA)-the rollover.3 6
Under ERISA, the consequences of plan involvement in a prohib-

27.

Note, Deferred Compensation: Lump Sum Distributions from Disqualified Plans, 34 U.

FLA. L. REV. 136, 140-41 (1981).

28. Id. The capital gains treatment accorded to those who were not self-employed not only
mitigated the effects of income bunching but saved proportionately larger amounts of money for
taxpayers in higher income brackets (who would also be most likely to have instruments yielding
capital losses against which the gains could be offset).
29. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
30. Id.
31. Note, supra note 27, at 141 n.52.
32. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of tits. 5, 18, 26,
29, 31, & 42 of the U.S.C.).
33. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., IstSess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 4639.
34. I.R.C. § 402(e) (1982). The distinction in treatment for self-employed individuals has
been eliminated.
35. Note, supra note 27, at 144.
36. I.R.C. § 402(a)(5) (1982). There must be a lump-sum distribution from a qualified
plan, and the proceeds must be transferred into another qualified plan or an IRA within 60 days.
The amount that may be transferred into the second plan or IRA is not limited so long as it
represents
the taxpayer's 1986
Published
by eCommons,
interest in the first plan and it is not subject to tax at that time.
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ited transaction3 7 were changed. Recognizing that the effects of disqualification were harshest with respect to nonmanagement employees,
who could have no control over factors affecting the qualified status of
a plan,38 Congress eliminated plan disqualification as the consequence
of engaging in a prohibited transaction and established an excise tax to
39
be imposed on the party in interest in the prohibited transactions.
ERISA also provided a means of retroactive requalification for certain
plans disqualified through improper use of language in implementing
documents.40
4
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) '
reshaped the rules for qualified plans by increasing restrictions on discrimination in favor of key employees (officers and major stockholders), 42 reducing maximum benefits,43 and increasing restrictions on distributions44 and loans.45 The effect of these changes is unlikely to be
known, because the rules of qualified plans have been reshaped by the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,48 affecting provisions for key employees,
maximum benefits, and distributions.
The Tax Reform Bill of 1985,'47 passed by the House of Representatives on December 7, 1985, contains numerous provisions that would
affect deferred compensation law. The bill proposes additional regula48
tions directed at preventing discrimination in favor of key employees.
With respect to lump-sum distributions from qualified plans, the bill
would eliminate capital gains treatment altogether after a six-year
phase-out period and would reduce forward averaging from the ten

37. See I.R.C. § 503(c) (1982). See also supra text accompanying note 23.
38. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4890, 4903.
39. I.R.C. § 4975 (1982). The Tax Court has held, however, that the penalty provisions do
not preclude disqualification in extreme circumstances. Winger's Dep't Store, Inc. v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 869 (1984).
40. I.R.C. § 401(b) (1982). Plans may be retroactively amended and awarded qualified
status for the entire period, generally within the employer's taxable year, but not for prior years,
where the plan is found to have "disqualifying provisions." Treas. Reg. § 1.401(b)-I(b) (1976).
This would usually involve new plans with improper language or omitted provisions or existing
plans which have not been properly amended to meet newly enacted requirements. See Stogel &
Ervin, Keeping the Qualified Pension Plan Qualified and Recognizing the Tax Effects of Disqualification, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 565, 567-71.
41. Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of tits. 26, 28,
29, 31, 42, 45, 47, & 49 of the U.S.C.).
42. I.R.C. § 416 (1982).
43. I.R.C. § 415(b)(1) (1982).
44. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (1982).
72
45. I.R.C. § (p) (1982).
46. Pub. L. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
47. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., 689-91, 709-12 (1985).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7
48. Id. at 732-33.
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years currently allowed to five years.4 9 Even if the bill is enacted without significant alteration, additional changes are likely to follow. The
Secretary of the Treasury is directed to undertake a comprehensive
study of current deferred compensation law and to report findings and
recommendations for changes to the House of Representatives."
The continuing changes in deferred compensation law increase the
likelihood that the status of plans as qualified or nonqualified may undergo frequent redeterminations. The fluidity in the law underlying tax
treatment of deferred compensation may account in part for the split in
opinion among courts concerning proper treatment for lump-sum distributions to taxpayers from plans that were qualified at the time of some
or all contributions but were not qualified at the time of distribution.
B. Judicial Treatment of Distributionsfrom DisqualifiedPlans
In Greenwald v. Commissioner,51 separate tax treatment was accorded the lump-sum distribution amounts attributable to a plan before
and after the plan lost its status as qualified for special tax treatment.
The taxpayer was one of sixty employee beneficiaries of a corporate
profit-sharing trust plan approved by the Commissioner in 1945. 51 On
December 30, 1953, the employer corporation was acquired by another
corporation and all employees except the taxpayer withdrew from the
plan. After distributions were made to the departing employees, the
$90,281.08 in cash and bonds remaining in the trust was credited to the
account of the taxpayer.5" No further contributions were made and no
other employees participated in the trust after that time. On July 31,
1959, the employer-corporation underwent corporate reorganization
and, on or about October 1, 1959, was dissolved. The company acquiring all of the assets of the employer corporation transferred company
stock into the trust.54 The stock and cash in the trust were transferred
to the taxpayer in the plan-termination distribution and reported by
him as a long-term capital gain from a qualified profit-sharing trust. 55
The Commissioner contended, and the Tax Court and Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed, that the plan lost its qualified
status after the fundamental changes accompanying the 1954 acquisition. 56 The Commissioner and Tax Court concluded that, as a distribu-

49. Id. at 712.
50. Id.
51. 366 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1966).
52. Id. at 539.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 539-40.
55. Id. at 540.
Published56.by Id.
eCommons, 1986
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tion from a nonqualified plan, the entire amount was taxable as ordinary income to the taxpayer. 7 The court of appeals disagreed. The
court noted that if a distribution had been made (at the same time as
the distributions to the other employees) of the $90,281.08 credited to
the taxpayer's account in 1954 while the plan was qualified, it would
have been taxed at capital gains rates and that "[i]t would be harsh to
treat the taxpayer differently, merely because he [had] stayed on with
'
the same employer after the radical transformation of its business. "
The court of appeals then looked to the applicable Code language
(which has not been changed since that time) and determined that it
did not preclude separate treatment for different portions of the lumpsum distribution. 9 Under section 402(a)(2), capital gains treatment
was available for distributions "in the case of" exempt trusts while
"distributions . . . made . . . by any trust which is not exempt . . .
0
should be taxable as ordinary income" under section 402(b).1 The
court of appeals chose to consider $90,281.08 of the 1959 distribution
as representing a distribution of the amount credited to the taxpayer's
account when the plan was qualified-and therefore eligible for capital
gains treatment. The remainder of the 1959 distribution was a distribu1
tion from a nonqualified trust and taxable as ordinary income. The
court of appeals noted that separate treatment was consistent with and
supported by "the language of section 402(b), which envisages a yearof whether or not a profit-sharing trust is taxby-year consideration
62
exempt."
States63
The Greenwald approach was followed in Pitt v. United
where the taxpayer employee received a distribution from a plan with
qualified status awarded in 1959 when the plan was established, but
revoked in 1969 when an unsecured loan was made from the plan to
the employer company." 4 The taxpayer received a lump-sum distribution in 1970, which he reported as capital gain. The government argued
that because the plan was not qualified at the time the distribution was
made to the taxpayer, the distribution should be treated entirely as or-

57. Id. at 538-39.
58. Id. at 540.
59. Id. at 541.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. The Code provides that "[c]ontributions to an employees' trust made by an employer during a taxable year of the employer which ends within or with a taxable year of the trust
for which the trust is not exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be included in the gross
l.R.C.
I..." § 402(b) (1982).
income of the employee .
9472 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
63. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
64. Id. The loan was determined to have been a prohibited transaction under I.R.C. §
503(b)(1).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7
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dinary income. 65 Relying on Greenwald, the federal district court 6
granted summary judgment to the taxpayer. The district court held
that the portion of the distribution attributable to contributions made
to the plan while it was qualified was entitled to capital gains treatment; only the portion attributable to contributions made after the plan
had lost its qualified status was to be treated as ordinary income.67
In Hesse v. United States,6 8 the qualified status of a plan established in 1967 was revoked in 1972 when the employer significantly
reduced its work force. 69 From 1972 through 1974 employer contributions to the taxpayer's account in the disqualified plan were taxable to
him as ordinary income.70 In 1975, the plan was terminated and the
employee received a lump-sum distribution which he rolled over into an
IRA. 7' The distribution thus consisted of amounts attributable to contributions which were made after the plan was disqualified and which
were taxed during the year contributed and amounts attributable to
contributions which were made while the plan was qualified and which
were, at that time, not subject to tax. The IRS determined that the
portion of the distribution attributable to the previously untaxed
amounts was ordinary income and was not eligible for a tax-free rollover. 72 The federal district court disagreed 7 3 citing Greenwald, Pitt,
and Woodson v. Commissioner,7 4 in which the Tax Court adopted the
Greenwald approach.75 In granting a refund to the taxpayer, the Hesse
court noted that disallowance of favorable tax treatment, for a distribution of contributions made to the plan while qualified, would be unfair
to the employee who could have no control over factors determining

disqualification .76
The Greenwald approach has not been uniformly adopted. In

65. Id. at 9472.
66. A taxpayer is entitled to sue for a refund in federal district court only after having paid
the amount assessed and filing a claim for a refund. See I.R.C. § 7422 (1982); 28 U.S.C. §
1346(a)(1) (1982). A taxpayer who receives a notice of deficiency may, within 90 days, file a
petition for determination in the Tax Court without payment of the amount assessed. I.R.C. §
6213(a) (1982).
67. Pitt, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 9472.
68. 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9153 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
69. Id.
70. Id. Contributions made to an employee's account without risk of forfeiture are deductible to the employer and taxable as ordinary income to the employee under I.R.C. § 402(b)
(1982). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
71. Hesse, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 1 9153.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 73 T.C. 779 (1980). The Tax Court's opinion was reversed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. See infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 786.
81-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) at 9153.
Published76.by Hesse,
eCommons,
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1972, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a taxpayer was not entitled to favorable tax treatment on a distribution from
a trust plan accorded qualified status throughout the period during
7
which contributions were made and up to the time of distribution.7 In
this case, however, it was the distribution itself that did not meet statutory requirements for qualified plans, 78 and the case has not had significant precedential value.79
The refusal of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to use
the Greenwald approach in the appeal of the Tax Court's decision in
Woodson v. Commissioner," however, has had a major impact. The
taxpayer was the president of a small corporation and a participant in
the corporation's profit-sharing trust, which had been accorded qualified status when it was established in 1966.81 In 1973 the qualified status was revoked when the plan was found not to meet requirements for
protection of beneficiary interests. 82 In 1974 the taxpayer received a
lump-sum distribution of $25,485.98, with only $2,643.39 attributable
83
to contributions made after the plan was disqualified. The Commissioner contended that the entire amount of the distribution should be
taxed as ordinary income, but, following the Greenwald approach, the
Tax Court had held that the portion of the distribution attributable to
contributions made while the plan was qualified was entitled to
favorable tax treatment. 8
The court of appeals, however, concluded that the Code language
could not support this result: 86 "Section 402(a)(2) explicitly limits capital gains treatment of 'lump sum distributions' to instances in which
the distribution flows from an employee trust 'which is exempt from
tax under section 501(a).' "86 The court of appeals reasoned that "is"
could not be transmuted into "has been" and that the plain meaning of
the statute limited favorable treatment to distributions made at a time
when the plan had qualified status,8 7 as indicated in Treasury Regulation 1.402(a)-1(a)(1)(ii) 8 The court determined that strict interpreta-

77. Gunnison v. Commissioner, 461 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1972).
78. Id.
79. See Benbow v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 941, 947-48 (1984).
80. 651 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'g 73 T.C. 779 (1980).
81. Id.
82. The court noted the Commissioner's finding that "benefits were forfeited on partial termination of the plan and funds were diverted to purposes other than forthe exclusive benefit of
the participants .... " Id.
83. Id. at 1095 n.2.
84. Woodson. 73 T.C. at 784.
85. Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1095.
86. Id. (emphasis in orginal).
87. Id. at 1095-96.
88. Id. at 1096. The regulation states: "The provisions of section 402(a) relate only to a

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7

19861

COMMENT

tion of the language was supprrted by the statutory scheme, which provided for eventual elimination of all capital gains treatment for lumpsum distributions."s The court also noted that it had previously established that favorable treatment for one taxpayer (capital gains treatment for employee trust distributions) over other taxpayers (for whom
all forms of compensation was taxed as ordinary income) must be
awarded only at the express direction of Congress.9" The court of appeals held in Woodson that the entire distribution was taxable as ordinary income. 9 1
The Tax Court was forced to consider both the Greenwald and
Woodson approaches in Baetens v. Commissioner.12 The taxpayer was
a participant in a profit-sharing trust plan which was given qualified
status after its establishment in 1966."a Contributions were made by
the employer and credited to the taxpayer's account from 1966 through
1973, although the plan was not terminated until 1976. In 1977 the
taxpayer received a lump-sum distribution of $21,077 which he immediately rolled over into an IRA within 30 days. 94 Later in 1977, the
Commissioner issued a determination letter proposing disqualification
of the plan, 95 and in 1979 the plan was retroactively disqualified for the
1974 tax year and thereafter.9 6 The Commissioner contended that the
distribution received by the taxpayer in 1977 was from a plan that was
not qualified at the time of distribution and that amounts received were
eligible for neither capital gains treatment nor rollover into an IRA. 97
The Tax Court reviewed the case law and rejected the conclusions
of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Woodson, holding that
the Greenwald approach as articulated in the Tax Court's decision in
distribution by a trust described in section 401(a) which is exempt under section 501(a)
for the
taxable year of the trust in which the distribution is made." Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii)
(1966).
89. Woodson, 651 F.2d at 1096. Capital gains treatment is available only for portions
of
distributions attributable to contributions made before 1974. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1982).
The court
does not mention that distributions attributable to contributions to qualified plans after
1974 are
still entitled to favorable tax treatment through extended income averaging.
90. Woodson. 651 F.2d at 1096 (citing United States v. Johnson, 331 F.2d 943 (5th
Cir.
1964)).
91. Id. at 1094.
92. 82 T.C. 152 (1984).
93. Id. at 153.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 153-54. The Comissioner found that contrary to I.R.C. § 401(a)(7) requirements
for qualified plans, employee interests had been forfeited after the time when employer
contributions to the plan had been discontinued. Id. at 154.
96. Id. at 154 n.3.
97. Id. If the distribution was determined to be from a nonqualified plan, the entire amount
could not be deposited tax-free; rather, the amount that could be deposited into an IRA
would be
subject to the yearly limitations.
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Woodson was appropriate. 98 The Tax Court found particularly persuasive what it viewed as the clear congressional intent to afford distinct
9
treatment based on a plan's status as determined on a yearly basis."
The court noted that if a nonqualified trust were, after a period of
years, to be awarded qualified status, the distribution could not be
taxed as if solely from a qualified plan-amounts contributed while the
plan was not qualified would already have been taxed as (compensation) ordinary income to the taxpayer; separate treatment would be accorded portions of the distribution depending on the status of the plan
00
at the time to which contributions were attributed.' The court deter1 in the Internal Revenue
mined that the congressional use of "is"''
Code was descriptive rather than time specific, indicating a requirement for qualified status but not indicating times at which that status
must exist.' 0 2 The court further determined that interpreting the language to mean that the plan must be qualified at the time of contribution,' 0 3 best supported the statutory scheme for basing tax treatment on
04
status and determining status on a year-by-year basis.1 In reaching
this conclusion, the court held that insofar as Treasury Regulation
1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) was inconsistent with this interpretation, it was invalid.' 0 5 Since the distribution to taxpayer comprised contributions
credited to his account at times when the plan was qualified, the distri0
bution could be rolled over, tax-free, into an IRA.'
Accordingly, when the Tax Court was faced with a similar case in
Benbow v. Commissioner,'"7 it reached the same conclusion. The taxpayers were participants in a pension plan that was awarded qualified
status after it was established in 1958.108 The plan was terminated in
1978 and taxpayers received lump-sum distributions which they rolled
over into IRAs.' 9 In 1979 the plan was examined and in 1980, the
qualified status was revoked retroactively to January 1, 1976.110 The
distributions were, therefore, made at a time when the plan was not
qualified, and the Commissioner contended that the amounts received

98. Id. at 155.
99. Id. at 165.
100. Id. at 165-66.
101. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1982). See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
102. Baetens. 82 T.C. at 163.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 167.
105. Id. at 164.
106. Id. at 170.
107. 82 T.C. 941 (1984).
108. Id. at 943.
109. Id.at 943-44.
110. Id.at 944. "[I]t was determined that the plan discriminated among salaried employees."Id.
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were not eligible for any favorable tax treatment but were taxable as
ordinary income."' Relying on the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit's decision in Greenwald and the Tax Court's decisions in Woodson and Baetens, the Tax Court held that amounts attributable to contributions made to the plan while it was qualified were entitled to
favorable tax treatment and could be rolled over tax-free into an
1 2
IRA. 1
The Commissioner appealed the Baetens and Benbow decisions. In
an appeal with respect to two of the Benbow taxpayers," 3 the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court, following the
approach of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in their reversal
of the Tax Court in Woodson. The appeals court held that Treasury
Regulation 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) correctly interpreted code language to
provide favorable tax treatment only when a plan has qualified status
at the time of distribution and to require that the entire amount of
distributions from disqualified plans be treated as ordinary income. 1 4
The Tax Court decisions with respect to Baetens and the three
remaining Benbow taxpayers were reviewed and reversed on consolidated appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit." 5 The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Greenwald approach because (1) this court, like the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, found that Treasury Regulation 1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii)
correctly interpreted code language and (2) the Greenwald decision
"rested . . . primarily on [the] view that the taxability of
the transaction was not caused by the taxpayer."'1 0 The court of appeals addressed what it freely admitted was "a fundamental unfairness '""17 and
recognized that the Tax Court, in following the Greenwald approach,
was acting on its concern "that plan disqualification as a means of policing profit-sharing trusts penalize[d] innocent taxpayers rather than
the culpable officers and shareholders who ma[d]e the decisions which
l[ed] to the disqualification."'
The court of appeals concluded, however, that the result reached by the Tax Court "just was not what Congress intended.""' 9

III. Id. at 946.
112. Id. at 947.
113. Benbow v. Commissioner, 744 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985). The appeals with respect to
the other taxpayers were made to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Under 26 U.S.C.
§
7482(b)(1 )(A) (1982), venue is determined by the circuit in which a taxpayer resides.
114. Benbow, 744 F.2d at 745.
115. Baetens v. Commissioner, 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
116. Id. at 1163.
117. Id. at 1164.
118. Id.
119.eCommons,
Id. at 1162. 1986
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The court of appeals noted that with the enactment of the Em12 0 Congress
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
12 1
and eliminated the disqualificarecognized the potential unfairness
improprieties.1 22 The court
all-plan
not
tion sanction for some-but
concluded that Code language required the interpretation that distributions made from plans disqualified at the time of distribution were not
23 and that "it [was] the role of
entitled to any favorable tax treatment
1 24
Congress to remedy this inequitable result.

III.

ANALYSIS

The cases dealing with taxation of lump-sum distributions turn on
the interpretation of critical Internal Revenue Code language: "In the
case of an employee trust described in section 401(a), which is exempt
,,126 Treasury Regulation
from tax under section 501(a) ....
"The provisions of
unambiguous:
and
point
on
1.402(a)-l(a)(1)(ii) is
described in sectrust
a
by
section 402(a) relate only to a distribution
tion 401(a) which is exempt under section 501(a) for the taxable year
'26 As was noted by the
of the trust in which the distribution is made."
27 the court may overturn "regulations that exTax Court in Baetens,
statute,
ceed the scope of the statute, are plainly inconsistent with ' the
128
unreasonable."
are
or
statute,
the
are out of harmony with
Here, the regulation may indeed be inconsistent with the purpose

120.

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1976). See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying

text.
121. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit quoted from a Senate Finance Committee
report:
In practice these sanctions have not been satisfactory in discouraging prohibited
transactions ...
In addition, the present law's sanctions for engaging in prohibited transactions tend to
fall upon innocent employees ...
To resolve these problems, the committee bill changes the method of enforcing the
prohibited transaction rules. It imposed sanctions for prohibited transactions upon the parties in interest and fiduciaries who engage in these transactions in place of the sanctions
now imposed on the employee benefit trusts.
Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1164-65 n.5 (citing S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. at 94-94 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4890, 4978).
122. Neither of the two plans in this case involved prohibited transactions (for which the
disqualification sanction had been removed). The Baetens plan was disqualified after employee
benefits had been improperly forfeited and the Benbow plan was disqualified because it discriminated among employees. Baetens, 777 F.2d at 1165.
123. Id. at 1167.
124. Id. at 1164.
125. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2) (1982).
126. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(a)-I(a)(1)(ii) (1966).
127. 82 T.C. 152 (1984).
128. Id. at 164 (citing United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16 (1982); United
States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351 (1957)).
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the statute should serve. However, the regulation is not plainly inconsistent with the language of the statute.
Conversely, interpreting "is exempt" to mean at the time of contribution-as is required by the Greenwald " approach--does strain statutory language. This interpretation requires a strained combined reading of sections 402(a) and 402(b).' 3 0 Section 402(b) of the Code,
dealing with taxability of nonqualified plans, does not contain language
that expressly pulls in distributions from disqualified plans. The first
part of the provision deals with contributions to nonqualified plans and
is not applicable to the question at issue. The second sentence addresses
"[tihe amount actually distributed or made available to any distributee
by any such trust"' 3' and may be interpreted as referring to all distributions from nonqualified plans or only to distributions of contributions
to nonqualified plans. If the sections, read together, each address treatment of distribution of contributions to plans according to their status
at the time of contribution,the Greenwald approach is appropriate, and
favorable tax treatment should be accorded the portion of a distribution
attributable to contributions made to a plan qualified at the time of
contribution but nonqualified at the time of distribution. Nothing in the
language of the statute or any regulation requires such a reading, and
the plain language of section 402(a)(2) offers little support for interpreting "is exempt" to mean at the time of contribution.
It is clear, however, that the current positions of the Tax Court
and the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit are not founded on an
interpretation of the Code language. A year-by-year determination of
status is expressly required under the Code 3 2 and, under their interpretations, separate treatment of portions of a distribution is consistent
with the concept of the independent tax year.13 3 Even more important
is consideration for the employee.
The loss of an exemption should not convert existing qualified assets in an exempt trust to nonqualified assets in a nonexempt trust. To
129. Greenwald v. Commissioner, 366 F.2d at 538 (2d Cir. 1966) (holding
that lump-sum
distributions from disqualified deferred compensation plans were entitled
to favorable tax treatment for amounts attributable to contributions made when the plan was qualified).
See supra
notes 51-62 and accompanying text.
130. The Code provides:
Contributions to an employee's trust made by an employer during the taxable
year . . . for
which the trust is not exempt from tax under section 501(a) shall be included
in the gross
income of the employee .. . .The amount actually distributed or made available
to any
distributee by any such trust shall be taxable to him in the year in which so
distributed or
made available . . .
I.R.C. § 402(b) (1982).
131. Id.
132. id.
Greenwald, 366
F.2d at 541.
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hold otherwise would create a rule of law that would penalize the innocent employee who had no say in the management of the trust and
have anticiretroactively change the ground rules that he could fairly
13
pated would govern the taxability of payments to him.
Such a result is distinctly out of harmony with the historical trend
toward increased government regulation directed at protecting benefits
for general employees from discrimination in favor of officers, managers, and other key employees. It is also out of harmony with the express
congressional intent in the implementation of regulations: "providing
retirement income security" and "protect[ing] . . .individual pension
rights." '35
The judicial trend, represented by the decisions of the courts of
38
13 7
appeals in Woodson, 3 6 Benbow, and Baetens indicates reluctance
on the part of courts to interpret Code language to implement even
clearly recognizable policy objectives when the language must be
strained to support the interpretation. Now that the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit has joined the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
and Fifth Circuits" 9 in denying favorable tax treatment to any portion
of a disqualified-plan distribution, it seems likely that the Tax Court
will depart from the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 1966
Greenwald approach14 0 and will hold in future cases that the entire
amount of distributions from plans disqualified at the time of distribution is taxable as ordinary income and is ineligible for favorable tax
treatment (including rollovers).
This result destroys the very things deferred compensation regulation was enacted to protect. After a plan is disqualified, a taxpayer
loses his or her right to favorable tax treatment regardless of the number of years the plan met all requirements for qualified status, regardless of the duration of the taxpayer's participation in the plan while
qualified, and regardless of the amount contributed to his or her account while the plan was qualified. Upon lump-sum distribution, the

134. See Woodson v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 779, 784 (1980).
135. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639.
136. 331 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1964).
137. 774 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985).
138. 777 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1985).
pre139. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decided Woodson in 1981, and it is
v.
Bonner
decision.
that
follow
would
Circuit
Eleventh
sumed that the Court of Appeals for the
City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981).
140. The Tax Court may and does use different approaches in cases appealable to different
in
circuits, as long as in each case it follows precedent set by the court of appeals of the circuit
which the taxpayer resides. Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), afrd, 445 F.2d 985
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7
(10th Cir. 1971).
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entire amount is taxable as ordinary income and the taxpayer is often
in a far worse position than if he or she had paid tax on contributions
as they were made to his or her account, particularly since lump-sum
distributions may come while the employee is still in the work force (as
with a transfer to a different company or with termination of a plan
that can no longer be operated efficiently). The account that was to
provide secure retirement income and was entitled to special tax treatment becomes ordinary compensation "bunched" into one year, with
the tax penalty resulting from the progressive income tax rates.
Furthermore, because the rollover provision would be available
only for distributions from plans qualified at the time of distribution,
the employee, who has had no control over the qualified status of the
plan in which he or she was a participant, cannot save the character of
the fund as retirement income by immediately rolling it over into an
IRA over which he or she does have some control. The report accompanying the Tax Reform Bill of 1985 explains that the capital gains treatment and ten-year forward averaging which have been accorded to
lump-sum distributions from qualified plans are now perceived to "encourage individuals to withdraw tax-favored funds from the retirement
income stream and thus are inconsistent with the policy to provide individuals with income throughout the entire period of retirement. ...
[This policy] is now served . . . by permitting individuals generally to
roll over distributions into an IRA."'' In deciding Benbow, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit could "find no demonstrable Congressional purpose so clearly frustrated by a straightforward reading of
§ 402(a)(5) as to legitimize the result reached by the Tax Court."14 2 It
would appear that a demonstrable congressional purpose has now been
articulated. Even if neither capital gains treatment nor extended forward averaging is accorded to distributions from disqualified plans, the
tax-free rollover into an IRA might be allowed, at least for those
amounts attributable to contributions made when the plan had qualified status. The disqualification sanction would remain for plans that
failed to abide by the regulations and taxpayers would not receive special tax rates on what would otherwise be ordinary compensation, but
retirement income security could be preserved. It should be noted that
this is exactly what the taxpayers in Baetens and Benbow sought and
were refused by the courts. 43
A qualified plan loses its attractiveness as an incentive to an employee when qualified status is beyond the control of the employee and

141. H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 732 (1985).
142. Benbow, 774 F.2d at 745.
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when it is impossible to rely on any plan, no matter how dependable it
may have proven in the past. Employers may choose to offer only private, nonqualified plans with no special tax treatment but with predictable outcomes-plans that are not subject to governmental regulation
for the protection of employees against questionable use of funds or
discrimination in favor of key employees.
IV.

CONCLUSION

An overview of the development of tax law with regard to deferred
compensation plans demonstrates that Congress has become increasingly involved in the regulation of such plans to provide income security
for and to protect the pension rights of the general employee. Frequent
changes in the law have, however, precipitated problems in the retention of qualified status for such plans, and significant uncertainty has
developed with regard to the tax treatment of lump-sum distributions
of contributions made to a plan qualified at the time of contribution
but disqualified at the time of distribution.
A plain-meaning interpretation of Code language seems to suggest
that the entire amount of a disqualified-plan distribution should be taxable as ordinary income and should not be eligible for any special tax
treatment. Courts have recognized that this result frustrates congressional policy and objectives-transforming an employee's secure retirement income into an immediately taxable lump of compensation in circumstances he or she cannot control-and have held that those portions
of a distribution attributable to contributions made to the plan while it
was qualified are entitled to capital gains treatment where applicable,
ten-year forward averaging, or taxfree rollover into another qualified
plan. The judicial trend, however, is apparently toward the plain-meaning approach of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's Woodson
decision, such that treatment of lump-sum distributions is determined
entirely by the status of a disqualified plan at the moment of
distribution.
Problems with qualified status and lump-sum distributions can
only increase with the frequent changes that have been made in the
law. The voluminous tax legislation and comprehensive studies currently pending offer Congress the opportunity to enact provisions which
truly protect general employee pension rights and real retirement income security. Congress must enact language in section 402 of the Internal Revenue Code to ensure that innocent taxpayer-participants in
plans which become disqualified are not penalized by losing favorable
tax treatment and the opportunity for rollovers into IRAs. Treatment
of the distribution of contributions from a plan qualified at the time of
contribution must be such that, in the future, the policy-and-objectives
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss1/7
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approach and the plain-meaning-of-the-language approach both lead to
the same result and to fairness to the employee taxpayer.
Susan Newhart Elliott
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